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CODY CLARK BAKER,

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Defendant-Appellant.

Has Baker

failed to

show

the district court abused

its

sentencing discretion

by imposing a

uniﬁed sentence 0f ﬁfteen years With seven years ﬁxed following his conviction for aiding and
abetting aggravated battery?

ARGUMENT
Baker Has Failed T0 Show The
A.

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

Along with

three others,

Cody Clark Baker helped plan and execute

a vicious attack on

Sarita Alexis

Morgan with the

— p. 1 6, L20; PSI,

intention ofkilling her. (TL, p. 14, L.11

They picked her up; drove her

to the foothills; attacked her with a knife, rock,

her there to die with serious injuries.

acknowledged that the plan was

to kill

(TL, p.14, L.11

Ms. Morgan;

that

—

and

pp.1-3.

bottle;

p.16, L.20; PSI, pp.1-3.)

and

1)

left

Baker

he punched her; held her down so another

person could repeatedly stab her With a knife and beer bottle in the throat, side, and abdomen;

stomped her head; told her
her where she was.

left

was “What she deserved

that this

The

(PSI, pp.126-29.)

for pissing

wounds.

stab

was

(PSI, p.123.)

treated for serious bruises, scrapes,

was apparently a

A11 0f this

(PSI, pp.1, 278.)

and eventually

off’;

attack ended, according t0 Baker, because he

decided during the attack that Ms. Morgan “didn’t need t0 die.”
required surgery for a lacerated liver, and

him

result

Ms. Morgan
and multiple

of Baker and Ms. Morgan

“need[ing] space” from a romantic relationship as a result 0f Baker’s anger that “every time he

wants

t0

hang out with

his family [Ms.

he had previously warned Ms. Morgan
ﬁrst started dating,

you don’t wanna

Morgan] storms
that,

piss

me

been doing so When

I

and then I’m gonna

retaliate.” (PSI, p. 127.)

The

state

see that color,

— p.17,

L.5.)

nine years ﬁxed.

state

me

off and

I

off to where I’m seeing red.

can’t stop.” (PSI, p.127.)

Baker

At sentencing,
(T12, p.21,

to Baker,

even told her when

And

stated,

that’s

we

What she’s

“I’m gonna get

mad

(R., pp. 34-35.)

agreed not to pursue a persistent Violator enhancement. (TL, p.6,
the state

recommended an imposed sentence of ﬁfteen

years with

L.22 — p.22, L.3.) Barker’s counsel requested a period of supervised

probation or retained jurisdiction.

1

don’t piss

According

(PSI, p.128.)

charged Baker With aiding and abetting an aggravated battery.

Baker pled guilty and the
L.2

I

“You

off.”

References to ‘PSI’ are to the ﬁle

pagination of that entire ﬁle. Ms.

Wurst.” (PSI, pp.1-2, 45, 1212.)

(TL, p.30, L.24

titled

—

p.31, L.9.)

The

district court

imposed a

‘Baker 47399 psi.pdf’ and page references are to the

Morgan is transgendered and her legal name

is

“Nicholas Travis

uniﬁed sentence 0f ﬁfteen years with seven years ﬁxed.
53.)

Baker timely appealed.

L.23 — p.41, L.1; R., pp.51-

(R., pp.54-55.)

Of Review

Standard

B.

(Tr., p.40.

The length of a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse 0f discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472,

159 P.3d 838 (2007)). Where a sentence

0f demonstrating that

it is

is

475 (2002); State

V.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,

Within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden

a clear abuse of discretion. State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d

614, 615 (2001) (citing State V. Lundguist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). Likewise, whether
t0 grant probation 0r retain jurisdiction is Within the district court’s discretion. State V.

Idaho 724, 727, 864 P.2d 170, 173 (Ct. App. 1993); State
885, 887 (1977).

In evaluating Whether a lower court abused

conducts a four-part inquiry, Which asks “Whether the
as

V. Allen,

one 0f discretion;

its

98 Idaho 782, 784, 572 P.2d

discretion, the appellate court

trial court: (1)

(2) acted within the outer boundaries

correctly perceived the issue

of its discretion;

With the legal standards applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices available t0
decision

by

the exercise 0f reason.”

(2018) (citing Lunneborg V.

C.

district court’s

aggravated battery carries a
as an aider

and

abettor,

ﬁxed was well Within

maximum period 0f conﬁnement
is

and

reached

(4)

its

429 P.3d 149, 160

District Court’s Sentencing Discretion

sentence of seven years

Baker

it;

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

Baker Has Shown No Abuse Of The

The

(3) acted consistently

State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272,

MV Fun Life,

Wolfe, 124

the statutory limits:

0f ﬁfteen years, LC.

§

18-908, and,

a principal in the crime of aggravated battery, LC. § 18-204.

Therefore, the sentence Will not be considered an abuse of discretion unless Baker demonstrates

that

n0 reasonable mind could conclude the sentence was necessary
3

t0

accomplish any 0f the

objectives of sentencing. State V. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003);

Da_vis,

127 Idaho 62, 65, 896 P.2d 970, 973 (1995). “In deference t0 the

not substitute

trial

judge, this Court Will

View 0f a reasonable sentence Where reasonable minds might

its

m
m

differ.”

Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2018) (quotation marks omitted). In
determining Whether the he has met that burden, this Court considers the entire sentence but

presumes that the determinate portion Will be the period 0f actual incarceration. State

V. Bailey,

“The objectives of criminal punishment

161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017).

are

protection of society, deterrence of the individual and the public, possibility 0f rehabilitation, and

punishment 0r retribution for wrongdoing, With the primary objective being the protection 0f
society.”

Dobbs, 166 Idaho 202, 457 P.3d 854, 856 (2020) (quotation marks omitted).

State V.

“Moreover,

it is

clear, as a

matter 0f policy in Idaho, that the primary consideration

order and protection 0f society. A11 other factors must be subservient to that end.”

marks omitted). “The
the weight

deemed

sufficient.”

district court

appropriate.” Li.

I_d.

is

the

good

(quotation

has the discretion to weigh these objectives and to give them

“A

sentence need not serve

State V. Struhs, 158 Idaho 262, 268,

all

sentencing goals; one

may be

346 P.3d 279, 285 (2015) (quotation marks

omitted).

The
its

district court’s

thorough explanation of its reasoning demonstrates that

it

did not abuse

sentencing discretion, With the district court focusing primarily 0n the need to protect the public.

First, this

attack

by a

“was an extraordinarily serious crime,” a premeditated and “serious Vicious

on the Victim”

that easily “could

“trivial irritation.”

(TL, p.34, L. 1 8

have resulted in the Victim’s death,” Which was motivated

— p.35,

L.

1 .)

“The attack was

initially

intended t0

kill the

Victim,” and while the court acknowledged that Baker backed off of that goal during the attack, he

did so only after planning to

kill the Victim,

putting that plan into motion, and helping t0 beat the

Victim,

stomp on her head, and hold her down so

times, all t0 “teach [her] a lesson.”

Morgan
3.)

E

that

one ofhis compatriots could stab her multiple

(TL, p.39, Ls.4-14; PSI, pp.128—29.)

seriously injured as Baker and his compatriots left her

State V. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 377,

The

attack left

Ms.

Where she lay bleeding. (PSI, pp. 1

859 P.2d 972, 975-96

(Ct.

App. 1993)

,

(district court

did not abuse sentencing discretion Where, in light of the serious, Violent nature of the crime,

it

considered the sentence necessary for the protection 0f the public).

The court
issues.

27.)

additionally emphasized Baker’s apparent disregard for the law and his anger

The court noted that this was Baker’s “fourth major felony.”

While the court acknowledged

that the previous convictions

(Tr., p.36, Ls.1-3; PSI,

were not

pp.25-

for Violent offenses,

they “do reveal a pretty consistent pattern of not caring in particular about the 1aw[’]s
requirements,” and a “strain of impulsive and regular criminal activity.” (T12, p.36, Ls.1-9.) That

same pattern

is

reﬂected in a string of misdemeanor offenses (PSI, pp.25-27) as well as a string of

disciplinary reports while incarcerated (PSI, pp.11-12).

His

last

complete presentence report,

issued in 2018 after his conviction for introducing contraband while incarcerated, reﬂected that he

was a “high

risk” t0 reoffend. (PSI, pp.33-34.) Sure enough,

just over six

months

(PSI, p.1.)

And,

after

Baker committed the

being released from prison, having spent the

as the district noted,

last eight

Baker described himself as unable

instant offense

years incarcerated.

t0 control his anger

and

aggression. (TL, p.38, Ls.8-14; PSI, p. 127-28 (stating that he gets angry, starts “seeing red,” “can’t
stop,” is

“gonna retaliate,” and

“is

not coherent”).) The court concluded, correctly, that Baker “has

severe anger issues.” (T12, p.39, L.24

—

p.40, L.1.

ﬂ

211$ PSI, p.4 (noting diagnoses of anger

and aggression).) This crime clearly reﬂects Baker’s self—described
and the associated danger he represents

t0 the public.

inability to control himself

Next, the court noted that Baker had previously failed miserably on probation and had
resolutely refused t0 complete treatment and educational opportunities While incarcerated.

p.37, L.17

—

p.38, L.7.)

Baker was granted probation

after a conviction for

(TL,

grand theft in 2010,

only t0 immediately abscond from supervision, after which he was arrested 0n a second grand theft

Then,

When he was sentenced

t0 a retained jurisdiction

program, Within a

charge.

(PSI, p.28.)

week he

refused to participate in programming. (PSI, p.28.) Between 2010 and 2017, he began

approximately sixty educational programs while incarcerated, but did not complete a single one.
(PSI, p.30.)

The court reasonably concluded

that,

despite opportunities,

Baker has never

“demonstrated that he would follow through With the type 0f programming that he would not t0
follow through t0 get into a place where he

is

not dangerous to other people.” (TL, p.38, Ls.15-

23.)

Finally, the district court considered mitigating factors, including the fact that

somehow took himself

to

be defending his “makeshift family” (TL, p.35, Ls.13-25), took

responsibility for his conduct

to kill

L. 10

Baker

and had some role

in ending the attack before

Ms. Morgan (TL, p.40, Ls.13-17), had a difﬁcult childhood

— p.37, L3), and had mental health issues

he completed his plan

that involved abuse (TL, p.36,

(Tr., p.37, Ls.4-1 1; p.40, Ls.

1

-3).

But

in the court’s

discretion and in light of the evidence discussed above, the district court reasonably concluded that

Baker was not a candidate

for probation 0r retained jurisdiction, that

he represented a signiﬁcant

safety risk to the public, and the treatment and supervision he needed should be provided in a

structured, institutional setting. (Tr., p.38, Ls.1-7; p.38, Ls.15-23; p.40, Ls.6-12; p.40, Ls.17-22.)

On

appeal, Baker’s primary argument

is

simply a request for

this

Court t0 reweigh the

mitigating and aggravating factors t0 arrive at a sentence other than the one the district court

imposed.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7 (pointing t0 Baker’s difﬁcult childhood and his taking 0f

responsibility as indicating the district court’s sentence

district court

particular, the

it

imposed

The

fails.

permit) [this Court] t0 conduct

it

State V. Struhs, 158 Idaho 262, 269,

Baker additionally points

t0

was 0n parole

Morgan. (Appellant’s

According

brief, p.5.)

might have inferred that he was unlikely

on

parole.

happens relatively quickly
(T12, p.40, Ls.4-6.)

V.

t0

he

Baker

is

Windom, 150 Idaho

at the

to Baker, that is important

The

placed on parole, so

the district court’s

873, 881, 253 P.3d 3 10,

claiming that the

if

it

because the

believed he committed the

district court stated,

I

district court

“This offense also

think that needs to be factored in here.”

was not 0n parole when he committed

comment

district

time he participated in the attack on Ms.

had instead just been released having served

The context of

district court,

succeed 0n probation

correct that he

is

own evaluation of the weight t0 be

346 P.3d 279, 286 (2015).

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

after

[its]

an alleged error by the

court mistakenly believed that he

instant crime

of the objectives of sentencing, and, in

in light

given each 0fthe sentencing considerations.” State

offense, but

argument

primary obj ective of the protection of society. Abuse 0f discretion review “does not

require (nor indeed, does

1);

excessive).) His

considered the allegedly mitigating considerations t0 which he points 0n appeal and

articulated the reasons for the sentence

318 (201

was

his full sentence

suggests that the court

the instant

on a prior conviction.

was only making

the

observation that Baker had almost immediately re-offended after being released into the

community, suggesting the need for “treatment

Whether 0r not 0n parole, the
just six

months

district court

supervision, but

he committed

this offense.

it

As

Baker reoffended, and

from nearly a decade

after his release

community. The

community

fact that

in a structured setting.”

in such Violent

(TL, p.40, Ls.4-12.)

and dramatic fashion,

in prison is surely probative

did draw the inference that Baker

of his risk t0 the

was not a good candidate

did not rely on the misstatement that he

was 0n parole

at the

for

time

discussed above, this was Baker’s fourth felony conviction and he

had previously

failed

immediately on both probation and a retained jurisdiction program. Baker

himself declined t0 pursue parole during his previous incarceration, “citing concerns that he would

be unable t0 comply With parole conditions.” (PSI,

There was no shortage of evidence that

p.4.)

Baker would have difﬁculty complying with community supervision and, particularly

in light

of

the court’s very reasonable concerns regarding his anger, Violence, and the associated risk t0 the

community, the court reasonably concluded he was not a good candidate for probation.
Finally,

in

Baker argues

that the district court erred

programming When granted retained jurisdiction

here.

that

(Appellant’s brief, pp.7—8.)

it is

Not

surprisingly,

by citing his previous

failure to participate

as a reason not t0 grant retained jurisdiction

Baker does not

cite

any case law suggesting

improper t0 consider a defendant’s prior failure on retained jurisdiction when determining

Whether to retain jurisdiction again.
previous failure

When

facts discussed

above

supervision.

it

But neither did the

imposed the sentence

t0 determine that

Baker suggests

here.

district court rely exclusively

Instead,

it

Baker was too great a

relied

on

all

complete programming.

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

community

have given retained

jurisdiction a chance because the court could always relinquish jurisdiction 0f

failed to

that

0f the evidence and

risk t0 the public for

that the district court should nevertheless

0n

Baker refused or

But “[t]here can be n0 abuse 0f

discretion in a trial court’s refusal to retain jurisdiction if the court already has sufﬁcient

information upon which to conclude that the defendant
State V. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 677, 115 P.3d 764,

and Violent nature of

this crime,

not a suitable candidate for probation.”

(Ct.

App. 2005). Based upon the serious

Baker’s self—professed uncontrolled anger and mental health

issues, his criminal history, his previous failures

failure to participate in

768

is

on probation and retained

programming and educational

jurisdiction,

opportunities, the district court

and his

made

a

reasonable determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that Baker
for probation.

The
determined

That ﬁnding

district court

that, in light

is

was not

a suitable candidate

supported by sufﬁcient evidence.

considered the mitigating factors to which Baker points and reasonably

of the facts before

the sentence

it,

imposed was necessary

t0 protect the

public and ensure Baker received adequate supervision and treatment. Baker has not
the district court abused

its

shown

that

discretion.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

DATED this 23rd day of June,

Court to afﬁrm the judgment of the

district court.

2020.

/s/

Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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